The defeated armies learn lessons well. Who knows how Moscow could have behaved with regard to the developments in Kyrghyzstan, had it not been for the bitter lessons of the “Orange revolution” in Ukraine? Even the customary world wisdom has prompted at the time how to behave: not to show preference too openly and not to put all eggs into one basket. There's a saying in the East: “If you quarrel with your neighbour, leave at least one opportunity for reconciliation.” Russia acted precisely in the opposite way and suffered defeat, whose consequences may last indefinitely. In other words, “You've made your bed, now you can lie on it.”
The situation with regard to Kyrghyzstan was quite different. The attitude and behaviour of the Russian leadership in this case were almost irreproachable. Moscow's sympathies for the collapsing regime of Askar Akayev were quite evident. But they were not demonstrated too openly. Moreover, shortly before the February elections in Kyrghyzstan, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Igor Ivanov, received one of the leaders of the Kyrghyz opposition, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, in Moscow.

During the election campaign in Kyrghyzstan Moscow took the position of an outside observer, it was not engaged in any propaganda and agitation campaign for the party of power, and did not use political technologists to bolster up the ruling regime. The only fault occurred when the Kyrghyz opposition began to act quite energetically in the south of the country. Then the Russian TV channels talked about the unlawful actions provoked by extremists and drug barons. And the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, spoke in extremely unfavourable terms about “the so-called opposition” which, according to his information, “did not control enything for quite a long time.” However, after a brief consternation, Moscow has again found a proper tone of voice. Yesterday, Russian official assessment of the current situation in Kyrghyzstan differed very little from that in the West. It said that Russia was worried by the existing situation and considered that the way out of the crisis should be sought in restoring proper law and order as quickly as possible. As a result, when the opposition comes to power in Kyrghyzstan, Russia will not have to resort to self-justification for doing wrong to it. Russian interests in Kyrghyzstan will not suffer and the relations between the two countries will remain warm and friendly.

Everything would have simply been wonderful if not for “one but”. Moscow's “wise course”, judging by many things, was largely accidental. Kurmanbek Bakiyev was invited to Moscow mainly for frightening Askar Akayev and making him more conciliatory, for he tried to manoeuvre between Russia and the West for some time recently. The President of Kyrghyzstan was thus given to understand that Moscow's support should be deserved. And he understood everything correctly by having refused to grant the United States a permission to deploy its special purpose AWAX aircraft.

Last Monday Moscow offered help to Bishkek within the framework of the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty. It was hinted that the organization could begin talks with the leaders of the opposition. Askar Akayev refused. Otherwise Moscow would have received another Czechoslovakia of the 1968 pattern on the CIS territory. Apparently, the rapidly developing critical situation in Kyrghyzstan has prevented Moscow to say (and do) wrong things.